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D URING this survey period the appellate courts of Texas handed down
numerous decisions involving various rules of evidence. The cases of
greatest importance fall into these substantive areas: (1) Expert Opinion
Evidence; (2) Hearsay Rule and Exceptions; (3) Uncontradicted Testi-
mony of Interested Witnesses; (4) Dead Man's Statute; (5) Cross-Examina-
tion; (6) Judicial Notice; (7) Privileges; (8) Res Ipsa Loquitur; (9)
Unavailability of Witnesses; and (10) Parol Evidence Rule.
I. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
Opinions of Nontreating Physicians. Texas courts have long followed the
rule that when a doctor examines a patient solely for the purpose of mak-
ing a report and testifying, he cannot base his expert opinion concerning
the patient's condition solely on the medical history as related by the pa-
tient and purely subjective symptoms. To be admissible, the doctor's testi-
mony ordinarily must be based on a physical examination and a study of
objective symptoms and X-rays.' In Slaughter v. Abilene State School, the
Texas Supreme Court questioned the applicability of this rule. Slaughter
made a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act3 after he was injured when
a co-employee backed a tractor over him. The trial court entered judg-
ment on the jury verdict for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals, how-
ever, reversed the decision of the trial court,4 and, following the general
rule, held that the medical opinion of Slaughter's doctor was inadmissible
because the doctor examined Slaughter solely for the purpose of testifying
and based his expert opinion in part upon both the history given by
Slaughter and Slaughter's subjective symptoms.
The Texas Supreme Court changed this well-established rule and held
that the testimony of the nontreating doctor was admissible because it was
also based on a physical examination and a review of X-rays. The court
concluded that the general rule that does not allow a nontreating physician
* LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston,
Texas.
1. E.g., Goodrich v. Tinker, 437 S.W.2d 882, 885-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 419 S.W.2d 239, 241-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wallace, 70 S.W.2d 832, 833
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, no writ).
2. 561 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1977).
3. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970).
4. 546 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977).
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to base his opinion in part on the history of the case as related by the
patient, "places an unfair limitation upon a reasonable practice of those
preparing their case for trial, namely that of securing qualified physicians
and surgeons to make an examination for the purpose of later aiding the
court and jury to better understand the claimant's physical condition."5
The court reasoned that since the doctor had testified that the patient's
subjective complaints were consistent with the doctor's objective findings,
the case fell within the general rule allowing the use of testimony that is
predicated upon both personal knowledge and hearsay.6 The court agreed
with the commentators7 who had concluded that the better reasoned au-
thorities admitted testimony based in part upon reports of others if the
expert customarily relied upon such reports in the practice of his profes-
sion. The court expressly disapproved those decisions holding to the con-
trary.
Reasonable Medical Probability. The testimony of a medical expert wit-
ness must ordinarily rise to the level of reasonable medical probability
before it will support a damage award.' Thus, to recover in a personal
injury action, a plaintiff usually must establish that his medical condition
was in reasonable medical probability caused by the occurrence in dispute.
Courts normally will look to the substance of the medical testimony to
determine whether this standard has been satisfied, and the standard re-
lates only to the quantum of evidence necessary to support an ultimate
issue of fact; it is not the standard by which a medical expert must testify.9
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Stodghill,'O a workers' com-
pensation case, the issue presented was whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that an on-the-job injury was a
producing cause of the plaintiffs husband's death. The hospital listed the
cause of death as a myocardial infarction. To determine whether the
plaintiff had satisfied her burden of establishing that her husband's death
was within reasonable medical probability caused by his on-the-job injury,
the court examined the medical testimony of the two expert witnesses who
testified at the trial.
The plaintiff introduced the testimony of a doctor who had never seen or
treated the decedent and had only reviewed the decedent's medical
records. He testified that the decedent had been suffering from essential
hypertension, and that the injuries that he had received on the job "could
aggravate the progress, and trigger final complication to the hyperten-
5. 561 S.W.2d at 790-91.
6. See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 495 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland, 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.).
7. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 15 (2d ed. 1972); 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1404 (2d ed. 1956); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 668 (J. Chadbourn rev.
1970).
8. Eg., Insurance Co. of N. America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966); Beck,
Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 323, 325-26 (1977).
9. Beck, supra note 8, at 325-26.
10. 570 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ granted).
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sion."" When asked in a hypothetical question whether the decedent's
injury "hastened his death," the witness responded that "any kind of acci-
dent which produced a bodily injury, will trigger any complication in hy-
pertension, and basis-and the cause of death ...but the main thing
here, the man was injured, and that injury could produce probably some
kind of shortening of the life span."' 2 The treating doctor, however, was
"strongly of the opinion that the injury did not cause the [decedent's] heart
attack."' 3 There was also evidence that the decedent showed general phys-
ical improvement during the month immediately following the injury.
The El Paso court of civil appeals concluded that the cause of the dece-
dent's heart attack was determinable only from the testimony of medical
experts and therefore must be founded on reasonable probability. Neither
doctor, however, stated as his medical opinion that the heart attack was, in
fact or in reasonable medical probability, caused by the prior on-the-job
injury. Because the plaintiffs proof failed to rise to the level of reasonable
medical probability, the court reversed and rendered judgment that the
plaintiff take nothing. 4
Underlying Facts or Data. When testifying in state courts, an expert is
normally required to state the underlying facts or other data upon which
his opinion is based. A different rule, however, exists in federal courts, due
to rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
5
The plaintiff in Bryan v. John Bean Division of FMC Corp. argued suc-
cessfully in the trial court that the written reports of two metallurgists were
admissible even though they did not testify at trial either in person or by
deposition. Their reports were admitted on the grounds that they consti-
tuted "underlying facts or data" for the opinion of a third expert who testi-
fied for one of the defendants. The defendant's expert had not examined
the product in question, a clevis, '7 he therefore based his opinion in part
on data established by the two metallurgists. On cross-examination of de-
fendant's expert witness,"8 plaintiffs counsel made maximum use of the
opinions expressed in the reports of the two metallurgists. One of the de-
fendants objected on the ground that although the facts recited in the re-
ports were admissible, the opinions of the two metallurgists, who were not
11. Id at 399.
12. Id at 400.
13. Id
14. Justice Osborn wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that although he con-
cu:Ted in the reversal, he favored a remand instead of a rendition. Id. at 401.
15. FED. R. EvID. 705 provides: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or infer-
ence and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
16. 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
17. A "clevis" is a cast-iron tool used in bending an automobile axle for wheel align-
ment. In John Bean the clevis was designed and distributed by the defendant as part of a
wheel alignment kit. Id at 543.
18. The defendant's expert testified that the clevis, as manufactured, was sufficiently
strong to sustain the stress it would have encountered in normal use.
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before the court, were not. The trial court overruled the objection, stating
that the opinions were admissible because they constituted "supporting
data" for the opinion of the defendant's expert.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed
reversible error in admitting the opinions either as evidence of the under-
lying basis of the testifying expert's opinion or as impeachment evidence.
The court observed that, as with all exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
admissibility of the sources underlying a testifying expert's opinion de-
pends upon the two critical factors of necessity and trustworthiness. The
court then concluded that both elements were lacking under the circum-
stances presented. The court reasoned that since plaintifis counsel
presented the opinions of the two metallurgists to the jury without first
qualifying them as experts, the jury had no way of determining whether
the opinions were credible or worthy of belief. 9
Competency. Numerous instances were presented during the past year in
which trial courts were called upon to determine whether a witness was
competent to give expert or other opinion evidence. In Landreth v. Reed,2"
for example, the plaintiffs brought a damage suit as a result of the death of
their fourteen-month-old child, who drowned in a swimming pool at the
defendants' day nursery. The plaintiffs' expert witness, a clinical psycholo-
gist, testified that the plaintiffs' other child had suffered physical injury as a
result of the shock and emotional trauma caused by witnessing the efforts
to revive her sister immediately after she was removed from the pool.2
Defendants objected on the grounds that the witness was not a medical
doctor and therefore should not be permitted to testify as to the child's
physical symptoms or disability, but should be limited to testimony con-
cerning the child's mental condition.
The Texarkana court of civil appeals held that the trial court was correct
in admitting the testimony of the clinical psychologist. The court's ration-
ale was that the witness was a trained expert in behavioral psychology and
was therefore competent to testify as to the child's mental condition and
stability. The court then concluded that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish between strictly mental and strictly physical ailments, because
they each may manifest themselves by symptoms relating to the other."22
19. The court indicated that the plaintiff could have introduced the opinions of the two
metallurgists simply by calling them as witnesses for the purpose of impeaching the testi-
mony of defendant's expert. In the event they deviated from their reports, they could be
impeached by the prior inconsistent statements made in their reports. See generally Gra-
ham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence. .4 Promise
Unfulfilled, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 917 (1976).
20. 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
21. The psychologist testified that in addition to and as a result of the emotional
trauma, the child experienced "hyperactivity, distractability, loss of weight, extreme ner-
vousness and difficulty in sleeping." Id at 488. She also testified that in a child her age, the
physical symptoms were a common result of the type of mental and emotional shock that




In Harrison v. Humphries,2 3 a venue case in which the third party de-
fendant's plea of privilege was overruled, the third party defendant con-
tended that the evidence introduced as to the cause of the fire in question
was incompetent and therefore constituted no evidence. To prove the nec-
essary venue facts, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of an expert in
order to establish the cause of the fire.24 The plaintiffs expert witness had
received several years of schooling in heating and air conditioning, had
completed 160 hours of a certified building course, and had contracted
heating work for several years. Also as chief heating inspector for the City
of Amarillo, the expert had experience in inspecting prefabricated and
mandfactured fireplaces in residences.
After reviewing authorities that established that a trial judge's determi-
nation of an expert's qualifications will not be overturned in the absence of
a clear abuse of discretion,25 the Amarillo court of civil appeals concluded
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting and consider-
ing the testimony of the fire expert. Since the trial court determined that
the fire expert possessed knowledge or skill not possessed by ordinary per-
sons, the admission of his opinion was held to be within the trial court's
discretion.
In Texas Electric Service Co. v. Ragle,26 a condemnation case, the testi-
mony of a chemistry professor was not rendered incompetent merely be-
cause he testified only about a "possibility" of a nuclear accident rather
than the "probability" of such an accident. The professor was an authority
on nuclear waste disposal. The issue on appeal involved the extent of the
diminution in the market value of the appellee's land after the appellant
acquired an easement across the land for a railroad to be used to transport
nuclear waste. The appellant contended that since the expert's testimony
was only based upon the "possibility" of a nuclear accident rather than in
terms of "probability," the judgment in favor of the landowners was based
on incompetent testimony as to the extent of the diminution in market
value of their land.27 After reviewing the evidence, the court of civil ap-
peals held that the expert's testimony was competent even though he did
23. 567 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
24. To maintain venue in the county of suit, plaintiff relied on TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ArNN. art. 1995(9a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). Thus, the plaintiff was required to prove that
the defendant committed an act or omission of negligence in the county of suit and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of his damages.
25. Eg., Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
supra note 7, §§ 1400-1401.
26. 559 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
27. The test of whether an expert's testimony expresses a reasonable probability, as op-
posed to conjecture, is not based upon the semantics of the expert, but rather is determined
by looking to the substance of his testimony. Eg., Ralph v. Mr. Paul's Shoes, Inc., 572
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.). The chemistry profes-
sor in Ragle testified that there was a hazard and "real danger" to the occupants in the
territory adjacent to the railroad. He also testified that there was actual danger that nuclear
contaminants would be released through the actions of terrorists and that "it's easy to see
that there is a possibility there that something could go wrong." 559 S.W.2d at 456 (empha-
sis added). He admitted on recross-examination that all of his testimony was based on "pos-
sibilities" that he described as "very real." Id
1979]
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not testify in terms of "probabilities." The court noted that the professor
testified that "the danger is based on fact, rather than fancy, delusion or
imagination." 28
The competency of the testimony of a handwriting analysis expert was
called into question in Warren v. Hartnett.29 In that case the plaintiffs
moved to set aside the probate of the decedent's holographic will. At the
close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendants, who were the proponents of the will. On appeal the plaintiffs
argued that the trial court should have considered a handwriting expert's
testimony that due to alcoholism, the decedent did not have sufficient
mental ability to understand her business, the nature and extent of her
property, or the natural objects of her bounty. The expert based his opin-
ion on a comparison of the handwriting of the decedent's holographic will
with two postcards written earlier by the decedent. The court of civil ap-
peals, however, refused to give this testimony any probative effect. The
court's rationale was that the evaluation of abnormal mental conditions is
peculiarly within the field of medical science and that it was "aware of no
recognized field of scientific inquiry which permits divination of mental
capacity by persons whose expertise is limited to handwriting analysis."3
In a slip-and-fall case, Kimbell, Inc. v. Roberson,3 1 a lay witness was
held incompetent to testify as to how long a foreign substance had been on
the defendant's floor. To maintain venue, the plaintiff attempted to estab-
lish negligence on the part of the defendant by testifying that the foreign
substance had been on the defendant's floor anywhere from thirty to forty
minutes. The plaintiff admitted, however, that he had only been in the
defendant's store for ten or fifteen minutes and that he did not see the
foreign substance on the floor until after he had fallen. The court of civil
appeals held that the plaintiffs testimony was merely an unsupported
opinion or bare conclusion, did not constitute evidence of probative force,
and therefore would not support a finding of negligence even though it had
been elicited on cross-examination and thus was admitted without objec-
tion.
II. HEARSAY RULE AND EXCEPTIONS
Reputation Evidence. Certain types of reputation evidence are admissible
as exceptions to the hearsay rule. For example, reputation evidence of old
land boundaries, family pedigree, and a person's moral character is gener-
ally admissible.32 In Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Cooper33 the Texas
28. Id at 457.
29. 561 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Id. at 863. The court noted that nonphysicians may qualify as medical experts by
virtue of "special experience." Id Although the witness testified that she had "lots of expe-
rience" with alcoholics and had seen their handwriting, the court said that "mere association
with alcoholics and examination of their handwriting is not sufficient 'special experience' to
qualify a person as an expert in the fields of alcohol-related disorders and the effects of those
disorders on a person's handwriting." Id
31. 570 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
32. See generally 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY , supra note 7, §§ 1321-1329.
33. 563 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1978).
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Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether reputation evi-
dence was admissible to prove that a railroad crossing was extra hazard-
ous. Over the defendant's objection, the plaintiff produced two witnesses
who testified that the railroad crossing in question had a reputation for
being dangerous. Although the supreme court recognized that under cer-
tain circumstances reputation testimony is admissible, the court stated that
it "found no instances in which reputation has been used to prove a con-
trolling issue in a tort case such as the extra hazardous nature of a railroad
crossing."34 The court thus concluded that the evidence was inadmissible
hearsay.
Admissions Against Interest. Any statement made by or on behalf of a
party that is inconsistent with his present position is generally admissible
against the party as an admission against his interest.35 In Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Ashle 6 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
entered into a conspiracy to wiretap and eavesdrop upon the plaintiffs,
thus invading their right of privacy. On appeal Bell argued that the trial
court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements and claimed that the
judgment for the plaintiffs should be reversed because there was no other
evidence to support the jury's finding that Bell had engaged in wiretapping
or eavesdropping. The hearsay statements in question were introduced by
the plaintiff, who testified that T.O. Gravitt, a Bell official, told him on
several occasions that the company was wiretapping the plaintiff. The
plaintiff also testified that he was told that he had incurred the enmity of
the company's security organization. He testified to additional statements
made to him by other people representing Bell in managerial capacities,
who allegedly told him that they had been confronted by Bell officials with
evidence of their long-distance telephone conversations with him. The
trial court admitted this hearsay evidence under the "declarations against
interest" or "admissions against interest" exceptions to the hearsay rule."
In the leading case of Le Sage v. Pryor38 it was held that the declarations
of an agent or employee are admissible against the principal or employer
as an exception to the hearsay rule only if the declarations are made within
the course of the agent or employee's employment and bear a close rela-
tionship to the performance of the agent or employee's duties. If such dec-
larations are purely voluntary or made merely in casual conversation,
however, they are generally inadmissible.39 The court of civil appeals in
Ashley followed Le Sage v. Pryor and held that the plaintiffs testimony
relating to conversations he had with Gravitt concerning wiretapping and
34. Id at 238.
35. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Scott, 152 Tex. 1, 7, 253 S.W.2d 651, 655 (1952); see 2 C.
MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 7, § 1141.
36. 563 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. The trial court also admitted such evidence not for the truth of the matters asserted
but only to establish that such conversations actually took place. Id. at 641.
38. 137 Tex. 455, 154 S.W.2d 446 (1941).
39. Id at 461, 154 S.W.2d at 450.
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eavesdropping by Bell did not constitute an admission against Bell's inter-
est. The court reasoned that since Gravitt was not exercising authority
conferred upon him by Bell when he made the statements and his declara-
tions did not relate to Bell's pending business, such declarations were not
made officially, but were merely declarations concerning past events. The
court thereupon reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Bell.
In E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. P. Adair40 an employee obtained a judgment
against his employer for wrongful discharge, and the employer appealed.
The employer argued that the plaintiffjudicially admitted in his deposition
and in court that he sued the wrong entity. The defendant urged that the
company that actually discharged the plaintiff was E-Tex Dairy Queen
Company, which was not a party to the suit.
41
A judicial admission, unlike an admission against interest, which is pri-
marily evidentiary in nature, is a formal waiver of proof that relieves the
opposing party from proving the admitted fact and bars the party who
made the admission from disputing it.42 Such ajudicial admission, how-
ever, must be clear, deliberate, and unequivocal. The evidence in Adair
showed that the plaintiff knew only that there had been a change in the
ownership and managment of the defendant, but that "as far as the com-
pany being the same, nothing's changed, the address is the same.""1 The
court of civil appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that
the plaintiffs statements were not so clear, deliberate, and unequivocal as
to constitute a judicial admission that the plaintiff knew that an entity
other than the defendant fired him.
Business Records Exceptions. The question of which party has the burden
of separating the inadmissible portions of a proffered exhibit from the ad-
missible portions was presented in Hurtado v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Association.45 In Hurtado the plaintiff sued to recover workers' compensa-
tion benefits, alleging that he was totally and permanently incapacitated in
a fall that primarily injured his back. Texas Employers' Insurance Associ-
ation argued that the plaintiffs incapacity was due solely to prior and sub-
sequent injuries and conditions. Because the jury answered "no" to the
issue inquiring whether the plaintiffs injury was a producing cause of any
total incapacity, the trial court entered a take nothing judgment against the
plaintiff.
40. 566 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
41. Because of a change in ownership, E-Tex Dairy Queen Co., a partnership, was the
employer on the date of discharge, rather than E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc., a corporation. Id
at 39.
42. Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tex. 1969); Esteve Cot-
ton Co. v. Hancock, 539 S.W.2d 145, 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
Judicial admissions include facts admitted in pleadings, stipulations, or testimony. See Gev-
inson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d at 466. See generally 2 C. MCCORMICK & R.
RAY., supra note 7, § 1127.
43. Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tex. 1969); Griffin v.
Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 202, 338 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960).
44. 566 S.W.2d at 39 n.2.
45. 574 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1978).
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During the trial the defendant offered into evidence four exhibits that
represented the plaintiffs complete medical records from two hospitals
and two doctors. The exhibits reflected the plaintiffs long history of health
problems with diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and a prior back injury. The
plaintiffs attorney objected to the introduction of these exhibits, arguing
that under article 3737e4 6 the exhibits were "admissible only . . to show
matters upon which the minds of reasonable men cannot differ."47 This
argument appears to be based upon the leading case of Loper v. Andrews,48
in which the Texas Supreme Court held that expert medical opinions are
admissible under article 3737e only if the diagnosis is founded on a rea-
sonable medical certainty. The plaintiffs attorney in Hurtado objected to
the medical records, listing various excerpts from the records as examples
of inadmissible evidence.49 The trial court overruled the plaintiffs objec-
tions and admitted all of the records into evidence.
The court of civil appeals held that the trial court had discretion to de-
cide which party was responsible for specifically pointing out to the trial
court the objectionable parts of business records sought to be introduced,
and inferentially held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.5"
The chief justice, however, dissented, stating that since the plaintiff had
called the inadmissible nature of the medical records to the trial court's
attention and had mentioned specific portions of the records that he con-
46. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1978-79), a statutory excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, provides in part:
Competence of record as evidence
Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall,
insofar as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or
event or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or represen-
tative of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition
to make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be
included in such memorandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
Proof of identity and mode of preparation;
lack of personal knowledge
Sec. 2. The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or record
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph one (I) may be proved by the
testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified witness even though he
may not have personal knowledge as to the various items or contents of such
memorandum or record. Such lack of personal knowledge may be shown to
affect the weight and credibility of the memorandum or record but shall not
affect its admissibility.
See. 4. "Business" as used in this Act includes any and every kind of regu-
lar organized activity whether conducted for profit or not.
47. 574 S.W.2d at 537.
48. 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966). Some of the problems surrounding the admissibility of
medical opinions and diagnoses contained in medical records were discussed in Beck, Evi-
dence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 323, 334-35 (1977).
49. The defense attorney replied to the listing of these examples by saying that if there
was anything objectionable in the records, the objectionable portions could be excluded.
574 S.W.2d at 537.
50. 563 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978).
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sidered to be inadmissible, the trial court erred in ruling that all of the
records were admissible.
The supreme court agreed with the dissenting justice and noted that the
plaintiffs attorney made clear to the trial court that his objections to the
medical records were in part directed to the hearsay, opinions, and conclu-
sions they contained. Plaintiff's attorney also pointed out to the trial court
a number of examples supporting his objections. The supreme court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs attorney "was not required to examine each of
the 280 pages in the voluminous exhibits and segregate the inadmissible
items from the admissible items."'" After Hurtado, it appears that when
voluminous records are introduced, one can probably preserve error sim-
ply by objecting to the admissibility of the records and reciting portions of
the records that support these objections. Nevertheless, the more cautious
approach would be to ask the trial court for sufficient time to review the
records thoroughly to permit the leveling of objections to all of the objec-
tionable portions; otherwise, the trial court might exclude only those por-
tions of the records objected to and admit other damaging documents.
During the last survey period the Dallas court of civil appeals decided
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Stricklin. 2 In that case the court of
civil appeals, following the Black Lake test,53 held that for a summary of
records to be admissible, the underlying records must be admissible. This
past year the supreme court wrote a per curiam opinion refusing writ in
Stricklin with the notation "no reversible error.- 54 The supreme court,
however, expressly disapproved the intermediate court's holding that the
plaintiffs summary was inadmissible under article 3737e.55
In Johnson v. Brown,56 a suit to establish a constructive trust on certain
property, the court held that a ledger sheet offered by the defendant did
not fulfill the requirements of article 3737e and thus was not admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The ledger sheet
had been kept for many years by the defendant's father. There was no
evidence as to the date that the information in the ledger was written, al-
though the defendant did state that he first saw the ledger sheet about
51. 574 S.W.2d at 539. When evidence, only a part of which is admissible, is offered as
a whole, the sustaining of an objection to such testimony has been held not to constitute
error. The theory supporting such authority is that the objecting party does not have the
duty to separate the admissible evidence from the inadmissible. Powell v. Powell, 554
S.W.2d 850, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v.
Ellis, 421 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ).
52. 556 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 565
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978). See Beck, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 323,
371-72 (1977).
53. The Texas Supreme Court held in Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co.,
538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976), that in order to introduce a summary of voluminous records, the
introducing party must show that the underlying records are (I) voluminous, (2) accessible
to the opposing party, and (3) admissible.
54. 565 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1978).
55. The supreme court expressly disavowed the court of civil appeal's assertion that the
record in the case did not establish the underlying records' qualifications under art. 3737e.
id at 43.
56. 560 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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1970. After the trial court admitted the ledger into evidence, the jury
placed great significance upon the ledger sheet in answering the special
issues. On appeal the court focused on the requirement of article 3737e
that the document be made at or near the time of the act, event, or condi-
tion.57 Since the defendant wholly failed to satisfy this requirement, the
trial court erred in ruling that the ledger was admissible.
In Roylex, Inc. v. A vco Community Developers, Inc.58 both parties ap-
pealed from a judgment entered in a breach of contract suit brought by a
subcontractor against a general contractor. The trial court found for the
plaintiff subcontractor and awarded damages. On appeal the defendant
alleged that the invoices introduced by Roylex were erroneously admitted
into evidence since the proper predicate for their admission under article
3737e was not laid. The court recognized the general rule that before busi-
ness records may be admitted into evidence it must be shown that the per-
son who either made the record or transmitted the information to another
to record had personal knowledge of the act, event, or condition re-
corded.59 The court then observed that the plaintiffs bookkeeper testified
that she prepared the invoices in question based on information given to
her by the field supervisor, or someone else present at the project. She
stated that the field supervisor was at the project site at all times and that
because of his presence he had personal knowledge of the acts or events
recorded in each of the invoices. Notwithstanding the defendant's conten-
tion that presence on a job site does not necessarily provide a person with
personal knowledge of all that occurs there, the court concluded that a trial
judge may draw such an inference from the evidence and that the trial
court's finding would not be disturbed on appeal simply because a differ-
ent inference might have been drawn. The plaintiffs witness's testimony
was held to be sufficient to support the trial court's implied finding of fact
that the requisite personal knowledge existed.6°
III. UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF INTERESTED WITNESSES
The frequently contested issue of whether a directed verdict may be
based on the uncontradicted testimony of an interested witness was consid-
ered in several cases during the survey period. In Collora v. Navarro6, the
plaintiff sought partition of a farm, alleging that she owned an undivided
one-half interest by virtue of her common law marriage to Joe Collora.
Mr. Collora originally purchased the land in his name only and later at-
tempted to transfer it to Camille Corporation, predecessor in title to the
57. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § l(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
58. 559 S.W,2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
59. Skillern & Sons v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 3737e, § (b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
60. On appeal the defendant further alleged that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
invoices were made at or near the time of the act. The court held, however, that since this
objection was not made at the time the invoices were admitted into evidence, the objection
was considered waived. 559 S.W.2d at 837.
61. 574 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1978).
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defendant, Navarro. The only direct evidence offered to prove the exist-
ence of a present agreement to be husband and wife, which is one of the
elements necessary to establish a common law marriage, was the plaintiff's
testimony that she and Joe Collora had "agreed to a marriage."62 The
other two elements of common law marriage were conclusively proven by
evidence other than the plaintiff's testimony. The defendant did not cross-
examine the plaintiff regarding the marriage agreement, nor did he call her
as an adverse witness. There was no other direct evidence produced at the
trial that proved or disproved her testimony. Even under these circum-
stances, the court of civil appeals held that the plaintiffs testimony, stand-
ing alone, could do no more than raise a fact issue and could not support a
directed verdict.
63
The supreme court disagreed with the conclusion reached by the court
of civil appeals. Although the supreme court agreed with the general prop-
osition that testimony by a party or a witness who has an interest in the
outcome of a suit cannot form the basis of an instructed verdict because
the jury needs to determine the credibility of the witness, the court held
that this rule is "not without exception.",64 The court then determined that
the plaintiffs uncontradicted testimony conclusively established the fact in
dispute. The court applied one of the rule's exceptions, which dictates that
an instructed verdict may be based upon the testimony of an interested
witness when the testimony pertains to matters reasonably capable of exact
statement, is clear, direct, and positive, is internally devoid of inconsisten-
cies and contradictions, and is uncontradicted either by the testimony of
other witnesses or by circumstances.65
Three factors led the supreme court to disagree with the court of civil
appeals and apply an exception to the general rule in Collora. First, the
general rule governing the finality to be given to the testimony of an inter-
ested witness is a flexible one, and its application must turn on the facts of
each case. Secondly, the court of civil appeals erroneously stated that the
defendant had no way to disprove or contradict the plaintiffs testimony as66
to the marital agreement. Thirdly, the plaintiff's proof of cohabitation
and holding out to the public was corroborative evidence of her direct tes-
timony. Curiously, however, the court cautioned that the presence of these
three factors will not always justify the application of that exception.67
The opposite result was reached in Masco International, Inc. v.
62. Id. at 68.
63. 566 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978).
64. 574 S.W.2d at 69.
65. Id (citing 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 11.28.6 (rev. ed. 1970)). The
supreme court thought this exception to be "most appropriate when the opposing party has
the means and opportunity of disproving the testimony or testing the credibility of the wit-
ness, but fails to avail himself of It." 574 S.W.2d at 69.
66. The supreme court agreed with the dissenting opinion in the court of civil appeals,
which noted that the defendant could have cross-examined the plaintiff and tested her credi-
bility.
67. The court carefully articulated that each case must turn on its own facts even
though all three factors are present. 574 S.W.2d at 70.
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Stokley,68 in which a party asserted that his testimony conclusively estab-
lished a fact issue. In Stokley a seller of corporate stock brought suit on a
promissory note executed by the buyer as part of the purchase price. In a
series of special issues the jury determined that the plaintiff made certain
representations to the defendant, that the representations were false, and
that they were made to induce the purchase of the stock. The jury also
found, however, that the representations were not relied upon by the de-
fendant. On appeal the defendant argued that the evidence conclusively
established that he relied upon the representations of the plaintiff. The
court of civil appeals rejected the defendant's assertion, citing the leading
case of Gevinson v. Manhattan Construction Co.6 9 for the general rule that
evidence given by an interested witness, even though uncontradicted,
merely presents an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. The court
held that although Stokley had testified that he relied upon the defendant's
representations, such testimony was not binding on the trier of fact be-
cause Stokely was an interested witness."
In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Wendeborn7' the issue was whether
the decedent was intoxicated at the time of his on-the-job injury, and the
defendant sought reversal based on the uncontradicted testimony of an
expert witness. The jury was instructed that an injury received while "the
employee is in the state of intoxication" is not an injury received in the
course of employment.72 At trial the defendant introduced the testimony
of a pathologist who had performed an autopsy on the deceased. He testi-
fied that the results of a blood-alcohol clinical analysis test performed on
the deceased showed that his blood-alcohol content was 0.165 percent at
the time of death. He further testified that the American Medical Associa-
tion had determined that every individual with a concentration greater
than 0.15 percent would "'have lost to a measurable extent some of that
clearness of intellect and control of himself that he would normally' pos-
sess."7 3 The doctor then stated that, in his opinion, the deceased was in-
toxicated at the time of his injury. On appeal the defendant contended
that such evidence conclusively established that the decendent was intoxi-
cated at the time of his fatal injury or, alternatively, that the jury's finding
that he. was not intoxicated was against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence.
68. 567 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
69, 449 S.W.2d 458, 467 (Tex. 1969).
70. In Willingham v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1978, no writ), the appellant urged that a medical witness authorized to ex-
amine applicants for life insurance was an interested witness, and his testimony therefore
could do no more than raise a fact issue to be considered by the jury. The court of appeals
held, however, that since the witness's testimony was clear, direct, positive, and
unimpeached by anything in the record, his testimony conclusively established the fact in
dispute. Id at 529.
71. 559 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
72. Id at 109. Such an instruction is in accordance with the applicable provision of the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 1(3) & art.
8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
73. 559 S.W.2d at 109.
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The Eastland court of civil appeals held that the testimony of the
pathologist did not conclusively establish that the decedent was intoxicated
at the time he was injured and that the jury's finding was not against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court found no au-
thority for the assertion that the results of a blood-alcohol test established
a state of intoxication as a matter of law. The court further reasoned that
although under certain circumstances a high blood-alcohol content does
create a presumption of intoxication,"4 that presumption is rebuttable.
IV. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Transaction with the Deceased Texas courts are continually faced with
the question of what constitutes a "transaction" within the meaning of arti-
cle 37 16, 71 commonly referred to as the dead man's statute, and that ques-
tion emerged once again during this survey period. In Adams v. Barry76
the respondent sought to set aside the earlier probate of the decedent's
1968 will and to admit to probate an alleged lost will of the decedent,
which was claimed to have been signed in 1972 and in which respondent
was allegedly named as the sole beneficiary. The only evidence to support
the validity of the lost will was the testimony of the respondent herself.
She testified that she accompanied the decedent to a lawyer's office where
they executed their respective wills in the presence of two witnesses.77 The
respondent's testimony was excluded by the trial court and an instructed
verdict was rendered in favor of the probated will. The court of civil ap-
peals, however, reversed and remanded, holding that the respondent's tes-
timony was based on matters within her own knowledge, was not based on
any transaction with the decedent, and, therefore, should not have been
excluded under article 3716.78
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals and affirmed the holding of the trial court. The dead man's statute
is a statutory exception to the general rule that parties to a lawsuit are
competent to testify.79 Its purpose is to exclude testimony of a living party
pertaining to a transaction with or statement by a decedent, whose death
74. See Bolieu v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 S.W.2d 234, 236-37(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, writ refd n.r.e.); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701/-
5, § 3(a) (Vernon 1977).
75. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926) (emphasis added) provides:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judg-
ment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be al-
lowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by,
the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite
party; and the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions
by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any
transaction with such decedent.
76. 560 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1978).
77. Both of these witnesses testified at the trial and denied witnessing the execution of a
will by the decedent. 1d at 937-38.
78. 551 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977).
79. 560 S.W.2d at 937 (citing Roberts v. Yarboro, 41 Tex. 449 (1874)).
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prevents rebuttal."0 The rule does not, however, prohibit a party from tes-
tifying from personal knowledge arising otherwise than from a transaction
with or statement by the decedent.8 ' The supreme court in Barry held that
whatever personal knowledge the respondent possessed concerning the al-
legedly lost will of the decedent was inseparably connected with their joint
trip to the lawyer's office. Since the term "transaction" merely requires a
mutuality or concert of action, the supreme court held that their trip was a
transaction and article 3716 therefore barred the admission of the respon-
dent's testimony.
Waiver. Since the dead man's statute serves to exclude otherwise compe-
tent testimony of a party merely because it pertains to a transaction with or
statement by the decedent, the courts have strictly construed the statute.8"
In addition, there are numerous decisions in which parties have been able
to circumvent the restrictive effect of the statute by showing that the ob-
jecting party waived its applicability. 3 One of the most common grounds
for asserting waiver of the statute is that during a deposition the objecting
party questioned the proposed witness about the "transaction" with the
decedent. Although such questioning in depositions has long been consid-
ered a waiver of the statute, 4 questions in interrogatory form have rarely
raised the waiver issue.
The issue of wavier in an interrogatory form was presented during the
survey period. In Denbo v. Butler85 the court of civil appeals stated that
the dead man's statute could be waived through the use of interrogatories
that contain questions concerning transactions with the decedent, but in
Fleming v. Baylor University Medical Center8 6 the Texas Supreme Court
cast serious doubt upon this statement.
In Fleming a patient who was burned when oxygen that was supplied to
his room ignited brought suit against the hospital. The patient died prior
to trial, and his widow was substituted as plaintiff. The trial court granted
the hospital's motion for an instructed verdict, but the court of civil ap-
peals reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence raised issues of
negligence on the part of the hospital. The court of civil appeals noted,
however, that "another problem" existed in the case.87 During the trial
certain testimony offered was excluded on the basis of the dead man's stat-
80. See Walker, The Dead Man's Statute, 27 TEX. B.J. 315 (1964).
81. E.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 405 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ refdn.r.e.
per curiam, 407 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1966).
82. See Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291 (1944).
83. E.g., Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1970); Mueller v. Banks, 273 S.W.2d 88
(rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Smith v. Smith, 257 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Merriman v. Lary, 205 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
84. Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 1970); Merriman v. Lary, 205 S.W.2d
100, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. 523 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
86. 554 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 561 S.W.2d 797
(Tex. 1977).
87. Id at 266.
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ute. The evidence offered consisted of testimony by the plaintiff relating to
Mr. Fleming's physical and mental condition immediately prior to his ad-
mission into the hospital, between the time of his admission and the time
of the fire, and after he was burned. Such evidence was primarily designed
to show that Mr. Fleming was in a confused state during the five days
preceding the fire. The defendant contended that article 3716 precludes
the admission of testimony arising out of a transaction between a party
and a decedent unless the party is called to testify thereto by the opposing
party. The court of civil appeals concluded that since the defendant pro-
pounded written interrogatories to Mrs. Fleming that were directly related
to Mr. Fleming's mental and physical condition during his five-day stay in
the hospital, the defendant had waived the dead man's statute. Although
the supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, refused the defendant's appli-
cation for writ of error with the notation "no reversible error," in its opin-
ion the court expressly held that its ruling "should not be understood as
approving the portion of the opinion pertaining to waiver" of the dead
man's statute.88 The supreme court apparently disapproved of the lower
court's application of the waiver doctrine in a case in which the defendant
merely made inquiries in the form of interrogatories.
V. CROSS-EXAMINATION
Prosecutors frequently resort to the use of "have you heard" questions
on cross-examination of a defendant's character witnesses. In McIlveen v.
State89 the defendant complained of a series of "have you heard" ques-
tions,9" alleging that the questions were not propounded in good faith.
The court of criminal appeals held that a witness attesting to the good
reputation of an accused may be asked on cross-examination whether he
has heard of acts of the accused that are inconsistent with that good repu-
tation.9" The rationale for this rule is that the state should be permitted to
test the witness's knowledge of the defendant's reputation. The prosecutor,
however, may only ask such questions in good faith, and he must believe
that the inquiry has some basis in fact. The court of criminal appeals in
McIlveen held that since the defendant proved no bad faith by the prosec-
tor in asking the questions, no error was shown.92
The use of "have you heard" questions was also upheld in Williams v.
88. 561 S.W.2d 797, 797 (Tex. 1977).
89. 559 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
90. Among the complained of questions were the following: "Have you heard that Lin-
coln Mcllveen drew a pistol on Tim Robinson in Teague?" "Have you heard that in 1967
Lincoln Mcllveen rented. . . his building next door to his barber shop knowing it would be
used for illegal gambling purposes?" Id at 821.
91. FED. R. EvID. 405(a) also allows counsel to inquire on cross-examination whether a
witness attesting to the character of a criminal defendant has heard of particular instances of
misconduct by the defendant.
92. The court in Mcllveen considered it significant that the defendant made no objec-
tion on the ground of bad faith to any of the propounded questions during the trial. Also,
the defendant failed to develop any evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution at
the hearing on his motion for new trial. 559 S.W.2d at 821.
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State,93 in which the defendant was convicted of murder. The defendant
contended on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the state to cross-
examine his father during the punishment phase of his trial with "have you
heard" questions94 because the scope of the direct examination had not
included questions about the defendant's reputation. The defendant's fa-
ther had testified, however, that the defendant had never been convicted of
a felony offense, and he asked the jury to grant the defendant probation.
He also testified that the defendant had never given him or his wife any
trouble.
The court of criminal appeals held that the trial court did not err in
permitting the witness to be cross-examined in such a manner. The court
relied on Childs v. State,9 5 in which the court held that similar testimony
elicited on direct examination was "geared to persuade the jury to grant
probation by, showing them [the defendant's] good character and law abid-
ing habits. " 6 The Childs court held that the defendant cannot have a wit-
ness testify about his good character and then claim that he has not placed
his reputation in issue merely because the witness was not asked whether
the defendant "enjoyed a good reputation in the community,"9 7 and in
Williams the court reaffirmed that holding.
The improper phrasing of a "have you heard" question constituted re-
versible error in Sisson v. State,9" in which the defendant was convicted of
delivering cocaine. The court of criminal appeals noted that although it
is permissible for "have you heard" questions to contain details of the ru-
mored event alluded to, a question that injects an assertion of fact is
clearl improper.99 In Sisson the court held that the prosecution's ques-
tion' was prohibited because it contained the phrase "did in fact" and
therefore had the undeniable effect of asserting the matter as fact.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Garza, ' a workers' com-
pensation case, the defendant's attorney went beyond the prescribed limits
of cross-examination. The insurer appealed from a judgment for the
plaintiff, asserting that the trial judge's remarks to its counsel were com-
ments on the weight of the evidence that were calculated to and probably
did cause the rendition of an improper verdict. During the defense attor-
ney's cross-examination of the plaintiffs doctor, the trial judge stated that
the questioning was not material and merely constituted harassment of the
witness. The defense counsel responded that he intended to harass the
93. 566 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
94. The witness was asked the following question: "Q. Let me ask you, sir, whether or
not you have heard that on June the 14th, 1967, your son was arrested for the offense of
assault with intent to murder?" Id. at 925.
95. 491 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
96. Id. at 908.
97. Id at 909.
98. 561 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
99. See, e.g., Moffett v. State, 555 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
100. The question asked was: "Have you heard that on August the 7th, 1976, this De-
fendant with Randy Walter, Kay Miller and Donna Rana did in fact, smoke marihuana
together, have you heard that?" Id at 199 (emphasis added by the court).
101. 557 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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witness as much as possible on cross-examination. The judge replied that
counsel would not be permitted to harass a witness in his court; if counsel
continued, he would end up in jail. °2 The defense attorney persisted in
questioning the doctor about the number of patients he had examined for
the plaintiff's attorney. The trial judge held that the line of questioning
was not relevant and stated that the plaintiffs counsel was a member of the
bar in good standing. The judge subsequently admonished the defense
counsel to conduct himself in a "decent lawyer-like way."' 0 3
A trial judge generally has broad discretion in determining the manner
in which a trial is to be conducted in his court, including the extent to
which cross-examination will be allowed."° After holding that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion, the court of appeals stated that the de-
fense counsel's remarks were contemptuous of both the trial judge and the
witness because it is always improper to threaten or browbeat a witness. 105
In Logan v. Barge °6 a widow brought suit against the son, daughter,
and daughter-in-law of her deceased husband, alleging a conspiracy to de-
fraud her of community property rights in her husband's estate. During
the trial one of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that his son had purchased
land from the decedent, thereby incurring a debt that was not fully dis-
charged at the time of the decedent's death. The witness stated that the
balance of the debt was to be forgiven upon the death of the decedent.
The defendants denied that the debt was to be forgiven and sought to ex-
pose the witness's bias against them because of a dispute between the wit-
ness's son and the defendants. The plaintiffs objections to this line of
cross-examination, however, were sustained by the trial court. The witness
was the plaintiffs most important witness and gave the only testimony as
to several aspects of her case. Based on jury findings, the trial court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff.
It is well settled in Texas that a party may cross-examine an adverse
witness to develop any fact that tends to show that a witness might have
reason to be biased.'0 7 Thus, the exact nature of a business relationship
between a witness and a party is generally a matter to be considered by the
trier of fact.'0 8 The court of civil appeals in Logan v. Barge held that the
trial court erred in refusing to permit further cross-examination of the wit-
102. Id at 845.
103. Id
104. E.g., Best Inv. Co. v. Hernandez, 479 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sands v. Cooke, 368 S.W.2d I ll (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, no
writ).
105. The court of civil appeals also stated that since the bill of exceptions prepared by the
defense attorney to preserve the omitted evidence contained both admissible and inadmissi-
ble evidence, the defendant could not validly complain of the trial court's refusal to admit
all of such testimony. 557 S.W.2d at 847.
106. 568 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
107. See, e.g., Walker v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 425 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref d n.r.e.); Aguilera v. Reynolds Well Serv., Inc., 234 S.W.2d 282,
283-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, writ refd).
108. Aguilera v. Reynolds Well Serv., Inc., 234 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1950, writ refd).
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ness concerning the dispute between his son and the defendants. The court
reasoned that wide latitude must be given in the cross-examination of
damaging factual witnesses to show their possible bias and prejudice. The
court concluded, however, that in this case such error was not reversible.
VI. JUDICIAL NOTICE
The list of matters of which Texas courts are willing to take judicial
notice continues to lengthen. In Black v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.," a
usury case, the plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court erred in its
conclusion that the disputed interest charges were not usurious under New
York law. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant failed to file a
timely motion asking the court to take judicial notice of New York law in
accordance with the provisions of rule 184a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure."' The court of civil appeals held that no reversible error was
present even though no formal motion was filed by the defendant. The
conclusions of law filed by the trial court expressly showed that it judi-
cially noted the laws of New York and that it was sufficiently satisfied as to
the meaning and application of such laws."'
In Scott v. Abilene Independent School District"2 a United States district
court took judicial notice of the fact that an adjacent school district was
not inconvenient for a person living in Abilene, stating that the "two towns
were only about twelve miles apart and were connected by a good divided
highway." 1 3 Courts do, however, refuse to take judicial notice of some
facts. In Stoner v. Thompson" 4 an issue arose concerning whether a mat-
ter was properly set for trial under the local rules of Harris County, Texas.
The court of civil appeals held that since there was no evidence in the
record as to the contents of the local rules and it had no actual knowledge
of their contents, it would be improper as well as impossible to take judi-
109. 559 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1977, no writ).
110. TEX. R. Civ. P. 184a states:
The judge upon the motion of either party shall take judicial notice of the
common law, public statutes, and court decisions of every other state, terri-
tory, or jurisdiction of the United States. Any party requesting that judicial
notice be taken of such matter shall furnish the judge sufficient information to
enable him properly to comply with the request, and shall give each adverse
party such notice, if any, as the judge may deem necessary, to enable the ad-
verse party fairly to prepare to meet the request. The rulings of the judge on
such matters shall be subject to review.
111. 559 S.W.2d at 670. Similarly, in A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp.,
563 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which a judgment credi-
tor brought suit on a New York judgment against the judgment debtor, the defendant con-
tended that the law of New York had not been properly pleaded and proved and that the
court therefore had to presume that New York law was the same as Texas law. Although no
motion under rule 184a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was filed, the court stated that
a memorandum of authorities that cited the pertinent New York law was filed in support of
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and that it was sufficient as a rule 184a motion
requesting the court to take judicial notice of New York law.
112. 438 F. Supp. 594 (N.D.Tex. 1977).
113. Id at 596 n.2.
114. 570 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978), afl'd, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 258 (Mar.
14, 1979).
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cial notice of such rules." 5
VII. PRIVILEGES
Privilege Against Se/f-Incrimination. The fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is generally considered to be a privilege that is
personal to the witness." 6 A defendant, therefore, may not invoke a wit-
ness's privilege for the defendant's own benefit.' The situation presented
in United States v. Colyer" 8 was unique because the trial court, and not
the witness, invoked the privilege. The defendant was convicted of unlaw-
fully transporting a fraudulently obtained credit card in interstate and for-
eign commerce. The owner of the credit card testified that he met the
defendant at a bar and invited him to his apartment for drinks. He also
testified that he fell asleep and found his wallet missing when he awoke.
On cross-examination the defendant's attorney asked the credit card owner
if he was a homosexual. The prosecutor objected on the ground that the
witness was entitled to invoke his fifth amendment rights against self-in-
crimination and thus could not be required to answer the question." 9 Al-
though there apparently was no unwillingness on the part of the witness to
answer the question, the trial court agreed and sustained the objection.
The defendant contended on appeal that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by invoking the privilege on behalf of the witness and thus restricting
the cross-examination of the witness. The defendant further argued that
the witness waived his right to invoke the privilege by testifying that the
bar at which he met the defendant was frequented by homosexuals. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals commended the trial court's solicitude for
the witness's rights, especially since he was not represented by counsel, but
stated that the "better practice would have been to ask the witness either
whether he desired to claim the privilege or whether he wanted to consult
with his attorney."' 2° The court found no authority to indicate that the
trial court was entitled to assume that the witness would claim the privi-
lege simply because it was available. The court nevertheless determined
that the trial court's error was harmless.
115. Id at 515. The court also stated that attaching a copy of the local rules to the
appellate brief did not constitute proof of the rules. Other courts, however, in their discre-
tion, have taken judicial notice of local rules of procedure. See, e.g., Woodard v. Hopper-
stad Builders, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 422 U.S.
1008 (1975). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 120.
117. United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1008 (1975). In Mayes, however, defendant's counsel successfully asserted a witness's right
to remain silent by arguing that he was representing both the witness and the defendant.
118. 571 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. Since TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1974) precludes persons of the
same sex from engaging in deviate sexual intercourse, the witness's answer to the question
could have been incriminating. It is extremely doubtful, however, that the witness's homo-
sexuality had anything to do with his credibility. See 571 F.2d at 946 n.7.
120. 571 F.2d at 946. The Government admitted that the procedure followed by the trial
court was not in accordance with the guidelines established by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals for resolving the fifth amendment claims of witnesses. Id at 944.
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Privileges Created by Statute. The question whether article 342-210 of
the Texas Banking Code 12' creates an absolute privilege for information
relating to the financial condition of state banks was presented for the first
time during the past year.' In Stewart v. McCain 23 a subpoena duces
tecum was served on the relator, commanding him to produce at a deposi-
tion all documents and records concerning an examination of a certain
bank. The relator's motions to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum
and to grant a protective order were denied, and the relator thereafter filed
a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to vacate his
order. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended
to establish an absolute privilege against the disclosure of such confidential
information. Accordingly, the court held that article 342-210 prevented
discovery of the confidential section of the report.'
24
Similarly, in Valley International Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones,
Inc. 125 the defendant alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to permit its counsel to review certain court exhibits and in refusing to
admit some of them into evidence. Pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, a
witness was ordered to deliver to the court a savings and loan association's
correspondence file relevant to the plaintiff. The court reviewed the seven
documents produced and admitted one of them into evidence. The re-
mainder of the documents were considered to be privileged information,
and defendant's counsel was not permitted to review them.' 26 The defend-
121. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon 1973) provides:
[Aill information obtained by the Banking Department relative to the
financial condition of state banks, whether obtained through examination or
otherwise, except published statements, and all files and records of said De-
partment relative thereto shall be confidential, and shall not be disclosed by
the Commissioner or any officer or employee of said Department. Further
provided that no such information shall be divulged to any member of the
Finance Commission, nor shall any member of the Finance Commission be
given access to such files and records of the Banking Department; provided,
however, that the Commissioner may disclose to the Finance Commission, or
either section thereof, or to the State Banking Board information, files and
records pertinent to any hearing or matter pending before such Commission
or either section thereof or such Board. Further provided that upon request,
the Commissioner may disclose to a Federal Reserve Bank any information
relative to its members, and shall permit it access to any files and records or
reports relating to its members. Further provided that the Commissioner may,
in his discretion, if he deems it necessary or proper to the enforcement of the
laws of this State or the United States, and to the best interest of the public,
divulge such information to any other department of the State or National
Government, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
122. Although there had been no court decision that construed the effect of this privilege,
the attorney general had previously rendered an opinion determining that information held
by the Banking Department should remain confidential. TEx. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-147 (1976).
123. 575 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1978).
124. The supreme court recognized that a government in some instances needs informa-
tion concerning the affairs of its citizens to enable the government to perform its functions
properly, and that statutes therefore are required to preserve the confidentiality of the infor-
mation. Id at 137; see Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Informa-
tion Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1976).
125. 568 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
126. The privilege claimed was predicated on TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a,
§ 3.07 (Vernon 1964) (emphasis added), which provides:
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ant contended that the statute by its very language applied only to "books
and records" and did not bar discovery of correspondence of an informal
nature. The court rejected the defendant's argument and applied a com-
mon sense approach to the problem. Observing that the statute permits
every member of a savings and loan association to inspect books and
records relevant to his transactions with the association,127 the court con-
cluded that the legislature did not intend to omit correspondence from the
phrase "books and records" and thereby-prevent members from inspecting
their own correspondence.
VIII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
In Kimbell, Inc. v. Moreno, 2 ' a venue case, the defendant appealed
from an order denying its plea of privilege. The defendant contended that
the plaintiff could not maintain venue in the county of suit because the
plaintiff had failed to prove the necessary elements of a negligence cause of
action. To support venue the plaintiff relied, inter alia, on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to establish the defendant's negligence.' 29 The plaintiff
argued that proof of the existence of a foreign substance on the floor of the
defendant's store was sufficient to warrant an inference that the store-
keeper was negligent.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits the trier of fact to base an in-
ference of negligence upon circumstantial evidence when it appears that
the character of the accident is such that it ordinarily would not occur in
Otherwise, the right of inspection and examination of the books and records
shall be limited to the Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives as
provided in this Act, to persons duly authorized to act for the association and
to any Federal instrumentality or agency authorized to inspect or examine the
books and records of an association whose savings accounts are insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The books and recordsper-
taining to the accounts and loans of members shall be kept confidential by the
Commissioner, his examiners and representatives, except where disclosure
thereof shall be compelled by a court of competent jurisdiction, and no mem-
ber or other person shall have access to the books and records or shall be
furnished or shall possess a partial or complete list of the members except
upon express action and authority of the board of directors. The books,
records and files of an association shall not be admissible as evidence in any
proceeding concerning the validity of any tax assessment or the collection of
delinquent taxes, penalties and interest except where (i) the owner of an ac-
count is a proper party to the proceeding in which event the books, files and
records pertaining to the account of such party shall be admissible or (ii) the
association itself is a proper party to the proceeding in which event any book,
file or record material to the proceeding shall be admissible.
127. Section 3.07 also provides: "Every member shall have the right to inspect such
books and records of an association as pertain to his loan, Permanent Reserve Fund Stock or
savings account." Id
128. 563 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
129. Because this was a slip and fall case, in order to prove negligence the plaintiff in
Kimbell was required to establish that the defendant put the substance on the floor, or that
the defendant knew that the foreign substance was on the floor and negligently failed to
remove it, or that the foreign substance had been on the floor a sufficient length of time that
it should have been discovered and removed by the defendant. See, e.g. , Franklin v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the absence of negligence and the evidence shows that the instrumentality
causing the injury was under the management and control of the defend-
ant."30 The doctrine neither compels an inference of negligence nor does it
raise a presumption of negligence. 3 ' Thus, even if a party establishes the
facts necessary to invoke the doctrine, he nevertheless must secure a find-
ing of negligence.' 32 Because-he plaintiff in Kimbell, Inc. v. Moreno failed
to secure a finding of negligence, 133 he would have been unable to prevail
on his claim even if he had established the factors necessary to invoke the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. As a result the defendant's plea of privilege was
sustained.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was also relied upon by the plaintiff in
Goodpasture, Inc. v. Hosch, 134 another venue case. The sole issue pre-
sented on appeal was whether the trial court's finding of negligence based
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was supported by the evidence. Only
two witnesses testified at the venue hearing. The plaintiff testified that he
was working approximately 300 to 400 feet away from a grain storage ele-
vator when it exploded. He testified that he knew where the explosion had
occurred but he did not know the reason for the explosion. A special agent
of the United States Treasury Department, who was also employed by the
defendant at the time of the venue hearing, testified that he was in charge
of the team assigned to investigate the explosion to try to determine its
cause. He further testified that the investigative effort was inconclusive as
to the cause of the explosion. He admitted, however, that under the right
conditions a spark could touch off grain dust within a grain elevator and
cause it to explode.' 3
5
The Houston court of civil appeals determined that the trial court was
justified in concluding that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care
in the management and control of its grain storage elevator and that its
negligence was the proximate cause of the explosion. The court reasoned
that although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable when it can-
not be reasonably inferred from the evidence that the accident resulted
from the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is not required to negate
every other possible cause of the occurrence. The court indicated that
since the plaintiff made out "a primafacie case of negligence under the
rules of res ipsa loquitur, it was incumbent on Goodpasture to introduce
evidence to explain, rebut or otherwise overcome the inference that the
130. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1975); Owen v. Brown, 447
S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1969).
131. Eg., Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251-52 (Tex. 1975).
132. Id The court in Bell noted that only under extraordinary circumstances would the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur compel a conclusion of negligence as a matter of law. Id at
252.
133. The plaintiff actually had secured a finding that the substance had been on the floor
for such a period of time that the defendant should have discovered it, but even he conceded
that the finding was without evidentiary support. 563 S.W.2d at 352-53.
134. 568 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1978, writ dism'd).
135. The court of civil appeals determined that the evidence conclusively established the
defendant's management and control of the grain storage elevator at the time of the explo-
sion. 568 S.W.2d at 665-66.
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injury complained of was due to its negligence." 136
IX. UNAVAILABILITY OF WITNESSES
The death of a witness is universally recognized as grounds for admit-
ting into evidence former testimony given by him at a prior trial.'37 The
majority of jurisdictions also held that in the case of a witness who is
outside the jurisdiction of the court, the necessary predicate to the intro-
duction of his prior testimony is shown by proof of his permanent absence
from the jurisdiction and due diligence in attempting to secure his pres-
ence. '3 Until this year, the question of the predicate necessary to intro-
duce the prior testimony of an unavailable witness who is inside the court's
jurisdiction but temporarily unavailable because of illness was relatively
unsettled in Texas. 139 In AF Conner & Sons v. Tri- County Water Supply
Corp. 140 this issue was squarely presented and decided.
The proponent of the testimony of a witness who testified at a prior trial
but is unable to appear at a subsequent trial because of temporary illness
usually has at least two alternatives: (1) moving for a continuance until the
witness recovers from his illness; or (2) offering the prior testimony of the
witness as an exception to the hearsay rule. The ruling in each instance is
usually within the discretion of the trial court.' 4 ' In Conner one of the
witnesses at the first trial, a Mr. Garner, was in a hospital for surgery and
was unable to testify at the second trial. The plaintiffs counsel submitted a
written motion to the trial court requesting that the court reporter tran-
scribe Garner's testimony from the first trial. In its motion the plaintiff
alleged that Garner would be unable to appear as a witness, that he was
physically unable to have his deposition taken, and that his testimony was
essential to the plaintiffs case. The trial judge granted the motion and
issued the order. On the day of trial the defendants objected to the intro-
duction of Garner's prior testimony and moved for a continuance until a
deposition could be taken, or until such time as Garner could appear at
trial. The defendant's motion was overruled, 4 z and Garner's prior testi-
mony was thereafter introduced into evidence. The defendants objected to
the introduction of the testimony on the ground that they had no opportu-
nity to cross-examine Garner on the facts occurring between the first and
136. Id at 666.
137. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1403 (J. Chadboum rev. 1974).
138. Id at 205-09 & n.5; Comment, The Unavailability Requirement for Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule, 41 Mo. L. REV. 404 (1976).
139. The supreme court did, however, previously refuse writ of error with the notation
"no reversible error" in Harris v. Reeves, 421 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The petitioner in Harris, however, did not allege in his application for writ of
error that the court of civil appeals erred in holding that the evidence of an absent witness
ven at a former trial was properly admitted. The Harris case is discussed in A.F. Conner
Sons v. Tri-County Water Supply Corp., 561 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Tex. 1978).
140. 561 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1978).
141. Id at 471.
142. The trial court indicated that when the prior testimony was offered with a proper




second trial and that his testimony at this trial would differ from his prior
testimony. The plaintiff, however, submitted Garner's sworn affidavit that
his testimony would not change. The trial court ruled that the prior testi-
mony could be read to the jury because the plaintiff had established a
proper predicate for its introduction into evidence. The court of civil ap-
peals found no error in the admission of the prior testimony."'
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals,
stating that the proponent of a witness's prior testimony has the burden of
showing both the degree and duration of the witness's illness and that he
has exercised due diligence in seeking to obtain the witness's testimony.
The court added an additional factor for consideration: "Absent a ques-
tion of diligence, the problem becomes one of fairness to the respective
parties . ,,144 The court concluded that the trial court erred in admit-
ting the prior testimony in the face of evidence of changed circumstances
between the first and second trial and a dispute between counsel as to
whether Garner's testimony would be less favorable to the plaintiff than
his prior testimony. Furthermore, the court considered it significant that
Garner was "the only witness whose testimony was based on repeated and
actual inspections of the pipeline during construction and as such his prior
testimony undoubtedly carried significant weight with the jury."' 45
X. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The parol evidence rule states that in the absence of fraud, accident, or
mistake, parol or extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary
the terms of a written instrument. 146 In Chaplin v. Milne 147 the parol evi-
dence rule was invoked to prohibit evidence of a contemporaneous oral
agreement that a promissory note would be renegotiated on its due date.
Relying on section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 which ex-
pressly excludes evidence of contemporaneous oral agreements, the court
held that the extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the
note. 149
Parol evidence was admitted, however, in Hogg v. Jaeckle, '5 in which
five lessees brought suit to recover a security deposit paid to the owner of a
rented house. The written lease provided that $400 was paid as a security
deposit, but the plaintiffs orally testified that each of them made a $100
143. 541 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976).
144. 561 S.W.2d at 472.
145. Id
146. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955).
147. 555 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), provides that
"such terms as are included [in the written agreement] may not be contradicted by evidence
of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."
149. A similar result was reached in Huddleston v. Fergeson, 564 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ). It was held that error occurred in not excluding the pur-
chaser's testimony that contemporaneous with the execution of a contract the vendor had
promised immediate possession or return of the escrow deposit.
150. 561 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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security deposit, for a total of $500. The defendant contended that the trial
court erred in finding that the total security deposit was $500 because such
a finding was at variance with the terms of the written lease. The court
held that the parol evidence rule did not prevent a written instrument from
being subsequently modified or changed by oral agreement of the par-
ties. 151
In Ferguson v. Yorfino' 52 the plaintiff brought suit on a written contract
to build a home, alleging that he had overpaid the general contractor. The
contractor filed a counterclaim, asserting that the owner had failed to pay
him certain amounts that were due. The contractor also testified that he
signed the first contract after the plaintiff told him that it was only for the
purpose of obtaining a loan on the residence. The contractor also testified
that he told the plaintiff that he could not complete the job for the amount
stated in the first contract and that he wanted an open-end contract. Ac-
cording to the contractor's testimony, the owner prepared a second agree-
ment that voided the first contract. The plaintiff testified, however, that
the second contract was made under duress when the contractor
threatened to walk off the job if the plaintiff did not sign another agree-
ment. On appeal from a jury finding in favor of the contractor, the plain-
tiff claimed that the trial court erred in allowing testimony that
contradicted the terms of the first agreement. The plaintiff argued that
since there was no pleading or evidence that the first contract was induced
by fraud, accident, or mistake, any evidence introduced to vary the terms
of that contract would violate the parol evidence rule.
The court of civil appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument, holding that
parol evidence is admissible to show that a written contract does not actu-
ally evidence any agreement between the parties. Since the testimony of
the contractor attacked the validity of the first contract and tended to show
that the contract was nonexistent, the parol evidence rule was not applica-
ble, and it was not necessary for the defendant to plead or prove fraud,
accident, or mistake.' 53
The supreme court in Town North National Bank v. Broaddus'54 was
confronted with the issue of whether the parol evidence rule prohibits the
151. Id at 570; see 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 7, § 1671.
152. 570 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. A similar result was reached in Our Fair Lady Health Resort v. Miller, 564 S.W.2d
410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ). It was held that extrinsic evidence was admissi-
ble to establish either that the parties did not intend for the contract to take effect immedi-
ately or that a contract did not even exist. The defendant, who was sued for the unpaid
balance due on an installment contract executed by her, successfully contended that the
plaintiff's agent represented to her at the time she signed the contract that the contract would
not be effective until the lapse of a three-day period, during which time she could cancel the
contract.
In Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. 1977), a letter and check
relating to "lease rentals" were held to be of a contractual nature. Extrinsic parol evidence,
therefore, was held not to be admissible to establish that the "lease rental" was actually a
bonus consideration for an unexecuted lease rather than rental due under a prior executed
lease.
154. 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978).
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admission of extrinsic evidence that the maker of a promissory note was
induced to sign the note by the payee's representations that the maker
would not be liable for repayment. The trial court granted the payee's
motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the defendants' affidavits,
which raised fact questions concerning the means used to induce them to
sign the promissory note. The court of civil appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for determination of the question of fraud raised by the
affidavits, stating that evidence introduced to show fraud in the induce-
ment is always admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule.'55
The supreme court, however, held that the allegations of fact, even if true,
did not constitute fraud in the inducement. The court distinguished the
cases relied upon by the court of civil appeals, 56 stating that in each case
"4some sort of trick, artifice, or device was employed by the payee in addi-
tion to his representation to the maker that he would not be liable."'5 7
Applying that distinction to the present case, the court found no evidence
that such trickery, artifice, or device was employed by the payee. The af-
fidavits offered by the defendants indicated only that the bank made repre-
sentations that they would not be liable on the note. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's decision that the facts stated in defendants' affida-
vit were inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and that summary
judgment therefore was proper.
155. 558 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977).
156. Berry v. Abilene Savings Ass'n, 513 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974,
writ refd n.r.e.); Viracola v. Dallas Int'l Bank, 508 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974,
writ refd n.r.e.).
157. 569 S.W.2d at 493.
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